An architecture for fault-tolerant computing is formalized and shown to satisfy a key correctness property. The reliable computing platform uses replicated processors and majority v oting to achieve fault tolerance. Under the assumption of a majority of processors working in each frame, we show that the replicated system computes the same results as a single processor system not subject to failures. Su cient conditions are obtained to establish that the replicated system recovers from transient faults within a bounded amount of time. Three di erent v oting schemes are examined and proved to satisfy the bounded recovery time conditions.
Introduction
NASA has initiated a major research e ort towards the development of a practical validation and verication methodology for digital y-by-wire control systems. Researchers at NASA Langley Research Center LaRC are exploring formal veri cation as a candidate technology for the elimination of design errors in such systems. In a detailed technical report 1 , we put forward a high level architecture for a reliable computing platform RCP based on faulttolerant computing principles. This paper presents initial results of applying formal methods to the veri cation of a fault-tolerant operating system that schedules and executes the application tasks of a digital ight control system.
The major goal of this work is to produce a veri ed real-time computing platform, both hardware and operating system software, which is useful for a wide variety o f c o n trol-system applications. To-ward this goal, the operating system provides a user interface that hides" the implementation details of the system such as the redundant processors, voting, clock synchronization, etc. We describe an abstract model of the architecture, a rst level decomposition of the model towards a physical realization, and a proof sketch that the decomposition is an implementation of the model.
Design of the Reliable Computing Platform
Traditionally, the operating system function in ight control systems has been implemented as an executive or main program that invokes subroutines implementing the application tasks. For ultra-reliable systems, the additional responsibility of providing fault tolerance makes this approach u n tenable. We propose an operating system that provides the applications software developer a reliable mechanism for dispatching periodic tasks on a fault-tolerant computing base that appears to him as a single ultrareliable processor. Our system design objective is to minimize the amount of experimental testing required and maximize our ability to reason mathematically about correctness. The following design decisions have been made toward that end: the system is non-recon gurable the system is frame-synchronous the scheduling is static, non-preemptive internal voting is used to recover the state of a processor a ected by a transient fault A four-level hierarchical decomposition of the reliable computing platform is shown in gure 1.
The top level of the hierarchy describes the operating system as a function that sequentially invokes application tasks. This view of the operating system will be referred to as the uniprocessor model, which is formalized as a state transition system in section 5 and forms the basis of the speci cation for the RCP. Fault tolerance is achieved by v oting results computed by the replicated processors operating on the same inputs. Interactive consistency checks on sensor inputs and voting actuator outputs requires synchronization of the replicated processors. The second level in the hierarchy describes the operating system as a synchronous system where each replicated processor executes the same application tasks. The existence of a global time base, an interactive consistency mechanism and a reliable voting mechanism are assumed at this level. The formal details of the model, speci ed as a state transition system, are described in section 6.
At the third level, the assumptions of the synchronous model must be discharged. Rushby and von Henke 11 report on the formal veri cation of Lamport and Melliar-Smith's 6 i n teractive-convergence clock synchronization algorithm. This algorithm can serve as a foundation for the implementation of the replicated system as a collection of asynchronously operating processors. Elaboration of the asynchronous layer design will be carried out in Phase 2 of our research e ort.
Final realization of the reliable computing platform is the subject of the Phase 3 e ort. The research activity will culminate in a detailed design and prototype implementation. Figure 2 depicts the generic hardware architecture assumed for implementing the replicated system. Single-source sensor inputs are distributed by special purpose hardware executing a Byzantine agreement algorithm. Replicated actuator outputs are all delivered in parallel to the actuators, where force-sum voting occurs. Interprocessor communication links allow replicated processors to exchange and vote on the results of task computations. 
Previous E orts
Many techniques for implementing fault-tolerance through redundancy have been developed over the past decade, e.g. SIFT 2 , FTMP 3 , FTP 5 , MAFT 12 , and MARS 4 . An often overlooked but signi cant factor in the development process is the approach to system veri cation. In SIFT and MAFT, serious consideration was given to the need to mathematically reason about the system. In FTMP and FTP, the veri cation concept was almost exclusively testing.
Among previous e orts, only the SIFT project attempted to use formal methods 9 . Although the SIFT operating system was never completely veri ed 10 , the concept of Byzantine Generals algorithms was developed 7 a s w as the rst fault-tolerant clock synchronization algorithm with a mathematical performance proof 6 . Other theoretical investigations have also addressed the problems of replicated systems 8 .
Application De nition
We present a method for specifying an operating system workload that characterizes the interface between the application software and the operating system. The speci cation consists of a generic set of mathematical de nitions serving as a schema. For an actual application, these de nitions would be instantiated with appropriate values. 
Tasks

Schedules
Application tasks are scheduled via a xed, deterministic sequence of task executions. A complete, repeating task schedule comprises a cycle.
::: Cycle i,1 Cycle i Cycle i+1 :::
Cycles are repeated inde nitely and the task execution sequence of one cycle is identical to the others. A cycle is divided into M frames of equal duration. functions and dispatching pre-emptable, non-critical tasks.
The schedule for an entire cycle would assign task executions to each subframe gure 3. We refer to each site in a task schedule as a cell. A cell is denoted by the pair i; j for the i th frame and j th subframe. A s c hedule is then given by a mapping from cells into the scheduled task:
ST :f0::M , 1g nat ! f 0 ::Kg STi; j gives the task index of the scheduled task for cell i; j, and 0 for j M i nat denotes the natural numbers.
Now consider the binding of input values for task execution. For task T i , w e m ust supply inputs for the arguments of f i . Each input must come from a prior task execution or be taken as sensor input. So the designation of a task input will be a triple i type; i; j where i type 2 f sensor; cellg with the meaning:
sensor value from sensor i in current frame cell value from task output in cell i; j of current or previous cycle A task may get input from a prior task output up to one cycle length in the past M frames. By convention, if the task in cell k;l receives input from the task in cell i; j where i k _ i = k j l then the input comes from i; j's task execution during the previous cycle.
A mapping from cells into sequences of triples denes the assignment of input values to task executions.
T I:f 0 ::M , 1g nat ! sequencetriple T I i; j = t 1 ; i 1 ; j 1 ; :::; t n ; i n ; j n for a task with n inputs. Let T I i; j = when j M i or the task at i; j has no inputs.
The functions ST and T Ineed to be supplemented by a binding of task outputs to actuators for actuator" tasks: AO : f0::M , 1g nat ! f 0 ::qg AOi; j = a to designate that the output of the task at cell i; j should go to actuator a. As before, AOi; j = 0 i f j M i or the task at i; j d o e s n o t produce actuator output.
Provided the functions T Iand AO satisfy certain well-formedness constraints, they su ce to uniquely characterize a task schedule. AO may not allow m ultiple outputs to the same actuator within a single frame.
Since task results may be carried forward from one cycle to the next, it is necessary to account for the previous" cycle at system initialization. The application must de ne what these previous-cycle task outputs should be for the rst cycle to use as suitable task inputs. A function IR:f0::M , 1g nat ! D is used to characterize the initial task results values.
Top Level Speci cation
The top level OS machine speci cation captures the behavior of the application tasks running on an ideal computer. It de nes the net e ect of task execution as seen by the control application. All details of the replicated system implementation are hidden.
OS State and I O Types
The state of the ideal OS consists of a frame counter and task outputs produced in the current and previous cycle. Thus an OS state is a pair: OS:frame denotes the frame counter while OS:resultsi; j denotes the task output at cell i; j during the current or previous cycle.
The application de nition needs to provide the initial state values for the results portion of the state. The initial OS state is given by the pair 0; I R , where IRde nes the initial results state values.
The following data types represent v ectors of sensor inputs and actuator outputs. Since the frame number is incremented by one, with a wrap-around when it reaches M, w e use the shorthand notation de ned as follows.
The function OS de nes the state transition.
OS : SinOS state ! OS state
OSs; u = u:frame1; i; j: new resultss; u; i; j The result of the function is a pair f;r containing the new frame counter and results state. The subordinate function new results is de ned below. new resultss; u; i; j = i f i = u:frame then execs; u; i; j else u:resultsi; j To refer to the execution of tasks within the current frame, the function execs; u; i; j gives the result of executing the task in the i th frame and j th subframe, i.e., at cell i; j in the schedule. Because the tasks in a frame may use the outputs of prior tasks within the same frame, which are computed in this frame rather than found in the result state, the de nition involves recursion through the task schedule. Details can be found in 1 .
Actuator Output
Since actuator outputs are always taken from task outputs, which are recorded as part of the OS state, we nd it convenient to de ne actuator outputs as a function only of the OS state, as in a Moore" style state machine. To cast actuator outputs into a functional framework, we m ust account for the case of an actuator not being sent an output value in a given frame. We assume an actuator may be sent commands as needed by the application, which m a y choose not to sent output during some frames. Let us denote by the symbol the null actuator output, i.e., an output value indicates the absence of anything to send to the actuator. Then we de ne actuator outputs as a function of the OS state using the function UA .
UA u = q k =1 Actu; k W e use the notation m i=1 a i to mean a 1 ; . . . ; a m .
The function Act is used to de ne the output for each individual actuator. Because of the application restriction that at most one task output may be assigned to an actuator, the axiom above leads to a well-de ned result. The frame count is decremented by one because UAis applied to the new state after a transition, where the frame count has already been incremented.
Second Level Speci cation
The replicated OS machine speci cation represents the behavior of the OS and application tasks running on a redundant system of synchronized, independent processors with a mechanism for voting on intermediate states. Let R be the number of redundant processors. We use f1; . . . ; R gas processor IDs.
Each processor runs a copy of the OS and the application tasks. The uniprocessor OS state is replicated R times and this composite state forms the replicated OS state. Transitions for the replicated OS cause each individual OS state to be updated, although not in exactly the same way because some processors may be faulty.
Faulty Processors
The possibility of processors becoming faulty requires a means of modeling the condition for specication purposes. We adopt a worst case fault model. In each frame, a processor and its associated hardware is either faulty or not. A fault status vector is introduced to condition speci cation expressions on the possibility of faulty processors.
Voting intermediate results is the way a previously faulty processor recovers valid state information. The voting pattern determines which portions of the state should be voted on each frame. A state variable that is voted will be replaced with the voted value regardless of what its current v alue is in memory. W e will vote the frame counter on every frame and hence, will not include it in the voting pattern de nition.
Let the predicate V P represent the voting pattern.
V P : f 0 ::M , 1g nat f 0 ::M , 1g ! f T;Fg V P i; j; n = T i we are to vote OS:resultsi; j during frame n. Since processors may be faulty and the values of their state variables may be indeterminate, we introduce a special bottom data object to denote questionable or unknown data values. The symbol ?" i s used for this purpose. We regard it as a special data object distinct from known good" objects. This usage is intended to model the presence of potentially erroneous data.
Voting is the primary application for ?. W e use the function maj : sequenceD f?g ! D f?g to denote the majority computation. It takes a sequence of data objects of type D and produces a result of type D. If a majority does not exist, then majS = ? ; otherwise, majS returns the value within S that occurs more than jSj=2 times.
The Replicated State
The replicated OS state is formed as a vector of uniprocessor OS states:
Repl state = vector 1::R of OS state Thus, if r is a Repl state value, then r k refers to the OS state for the k th processor. The OS state de nition is identical to that of the top level OS speci cation. The state variable r k :frame gives the number of the frame to be executed by the next transition within processor k. T o refer to a results element of a replicated OS state we use the notation r k :resultsi; j.
The initial state of the replicated OS is formed by merely copying the uniprocessor initial state R times. Thus, we h a v e:
Initial Repl state = R k =1 0; I R where IRdenotes the initial results state values as provided in the application task de nitions.
Inputs to the replicated processors come from the same sensors as in the uniprocessor case. The act of distributing sensor values via some kind of interactive consistency algorithm is assumed to produce R values to present to the replicated system. Therefore, we i n troduce a vectorized data type to use for input variables in the functions below. ICin = vector 1::R of Sin Thus, if c is an ICinvalue, then c k refers to the sensor inputs for the k th processor.
Replicated System Transitions
Transitions correspond to the execution of all tasks in a single frame for all replicates. Since the replicated OS state is a vector of uniprocessor OS states, we can rst decompose the Repl state transition into R separate cases.
Repl : ICinRepl statefault status ! Repl state Replc; r; = R k=1 RT c; r; k ; RT is the function used to de ne the OS state transition for each replicate.
The additional argument is used to supply assumptions about the current fault status of the replicated processors.
fault status = vector 1::R of fT;Fg k is true when processor k is faulty during the current frame. Various speci cation functions take arguments as a way to model assumptions about fault behavior and show what the system response is under those assumptions.
To de ne RT we m ust take i n to account whether the processor is faulty and apply voting at the appropriate points. Because voting incorporates values from all the processors, the entire Repl state is required as an argument t o RT even though it only returns the OS state for the k th processor.
RTc; r; k ; = if k then ?
else frame voter; ; Repl resultsc; r; k ; If processor k is faulty, w e regard its entire OS state as suspect and therefore assign it the value ?.
RT requires the frame counter be voted on every transition. All processor frame counters are input to a majority operation. Voting for a frame is based on values computed during that frame. Consequently, the incremented frame counter values are used in the speci cation. frame voter; = maj R l=1 F V l where F V l = i f l then ? else r l :frame 1
Because some of the r l m a y be faulty, w e assume their frame counters are questionable and produce ?
as their votes.
For the results state variables, we need to incorporate selective v oting. The V P predicate determines when and where to vote.
Repl resultsc; r; k ; = i; j: if V P i; j; r k :frame then results votec; r; i ; j ; else new resultsc k ; r k ; i ; j The function new results is de ned in the uniprocessor OS speci cation. It gives the value of the task results part of the state after a state transition.
De ning the vote of task results is similar to that for the frame counter. results votec; r; i ; j ; = maj R l=1 RV l where RV l = if l then ? else new resultsc l ; r l ; i ; j :
As before, some of the processors may be faulty s o some r l m a y h a v e v alue ?. W e assume task execution on faulty processors produces ? as well.
Note that voting within a frame occurs after all computation has taken place. In particular, the voted value of a task's output is not immediately available to a later task within the same frame.
Replicated Actuator Output
As in the uniprocessor case, outputs from the replicated processors go to the actuators. Each processor sends its own actuator outputs separately. Therefore, we i n troduce a vectorized data type to describe the replicated system outputs. 
Replicated System Proofs
We develop a methodology for showing that the replicated OS is a correct implementation of the uniprocessor OS. Previously presented concepts are put together with a framework for the replicated and uniprocessor state machines. Su cient conditions based on commutative diagram techniques are derived for showing correctness. Issues stemming from real-time considerations are not included in the following. In subsequent w ork we will address requirements such a s h a ving adequate real time to execute the task schedule and OS overhead functions.
Fault Model
In each frame, a processor is either faulty or not. A function Application task con gurations and voting patterns determine the number of frames required to recover from a transient fault. Let N R represent this number N R 0. We de ne a processor as working in frame n if it is nonfaulty in frame n and nonfaulty for the previous N R frames. We use a function W to represent this concept. W : f1::Rg nat fault fn! f T;Fg Wk;n;F = 8 j : 0 j minn; N R F k;n,j
The number of working processors is also of interest: !n; F = jfk j W k;n;Fgj A processor that is nonfaulty, but not yet working, is considered to be recovering. Finally, the key assumption upon which correct state machine implementation rests is given below.
De nition 1 The Maximum Fault Assumption for a given fault function F is that !n; F R = 2 for every frame n. Table 1 : Sets of inputs, outputs, and states.
All theorems about state machine correctness are predicated on this assumption that there is a majority o f w orking processors in each frame.
Framework For State Machine Correctness
Mappings are needed to bridge the gap between the two state machines. Let us refer to the uniprocessor state machine as UMand the replicated state machine as RM. W e map from RM to UMb y applying the majority function. We map from UMto RM by distributing data objects R ways. For sensor inputs, we assume an interactive consistency process is used in the system, so the net e ect is that sensor data is merely copied and distributed.
IC:Sin!ICin ICs = R i =1 s The majority mapping on replicated states and actuator outputs captures the notion that a majority o f the processors should be computing the right v alues.
Relationships among the various entities for the two state machines are characterized by the commutative diagram in gure 4. u n =OSs n ; u n , 1 a n = UA u n r n = Replc n ; r n , 1 ; F R n b n = RAr n ; F R n where F R n = R k =1 Fk;n,1 :
Not shown in gure 4 is the fault status vector argument to the functions Repl and RA.
The Correctness Concept
Our approach to the correctness criteria is based on state machine concepts of behavioral equivalence, specialized for this application.
In essence, what we want to show is that the I O behavior of RM is the same as that of UMwhen interpreted by the mapping functions ICand maj. W e s a y that the machine RM correctly implements UMi they exhibit matching output sequences when applied to matching inputs sequences and the Maximum Fault Assumption holds.
De nition 3 RM correctly implements UMunder assumption P i the following formula holds: 8F; PF 8 S; 8n 0 : a n = majb n where a n and b n can be characterized as functions of an initial state and all prior inputs.
We parameterize the concept of necessary assumptions using the predicate P. 
Design Proofs
Proving replicated system correctness for a particular voting pattern can be simpli ed by rst establishing some intermediate su cient conditions. The following treatment is based on the formulation of a Consensus Property, which relates the state of working processors to the majority of the replicated states. We use this property t o p r o v e the RM Correctness Criteria. This proof is independent of a particular voting pattern; it need be done only once. Similarly, the Consensus Property can be established by i n troducing a Replicated State Invariant. Then we construct a proof of the invariant based on the Full Recovery Property, whose statement is generic, but whose proof is di erent for each v oting pattern.
Adopting this methodology creates the following general proof structure.
RM 
Full Recovery Property
We i n troduce a predicate, rec, that captures the concept of a state element h a ving been recovered through voting. It is a function of the last faulty frame, f, and the number of frames, h, a processor has been nonfaulty. reci; j; f; h; e = if h 1 then F else V P i; j; f h^e _ if i = f h then V jTI i;jj l=1 RIT I i; j l ; i ; j ; f ; h else reci; j; f; h , 1; T RIt; i; j; f; h = t:type = sensor _ if t:i = f h^t:j j then rect:i; t:j; f; h; F else rect:i; t:j; f; h , 1; T By recursively following the inputs for the scheduled task at cell i; j, reci; j; f; h; e is true i resultsi; j should have been restored in frame fh, provided the processor has been nonfaulty for h frames and f was the last faulty frame. The boolean argument, e, indicates whether the recovery status applies at the end of the frame or sometime before computation is complete. This is necessary to account for the block v oting that occurs at the end of a frame.
The conditions for rec can obtain if i; j i s v oted in frame fh, or it is computed in frame fh and all inputs have been recovered, or it is not computed in frame f h and was recovered by frame f h , 1. Thus, cell i; j is not recovered if it results from computations involving unrecovered data, or it has not been voted since the last faulty frame f.
De nition 6 F ull Recovery Property The predicate reci; j; f; N R ; T holds for all i; j; f. This de nition equates full recovery with the predicate rec becoming true for all state elements i; j after N R frames have passed since the last fault.
Replicated State Invariant
As a practical matter, it is necessary to prove the Consensus Property b y rst establishing an invariant of the replicated OS state. Such a n i n v ariant relates the values of the nonfaulty processor states to the majority v alue of replicated OS states. To do so, it is necessary to identify the partially recovered values of OS states for recovering processors.
Expressing the invariant below requires a means of determining how many consecutive frames a processor has been healthy without fault. Let Hk;n;F give the number of healthy frames for processor k prior to the n th frame. In an analogous way, let Lk;n;F give the last faulty frame for processor k prior to the n th frame.
The Replicated State Invariant states that if the p th processor is nonfaulty during a frame, i.e., working or recovering, then its frame counter after the transition equals that of the majority. It also relates this processor's results state values to the majority if they have been recovered, as determined by the function rec.
De nition 7 Replicated State Invariant
For fault function F satisfying the Maximum Fault Assumption, the following assertion is true for every frame n: n = 0 _ F p; n , 1 r n p :frame = majr n :frame = n mod M 8i; j : reci; j; Lp; n; F; Hp; n; F; T r n p :resultsi; j = majr n :resultsi; j: Again, complete proofs of these theorems can be found in 1 along with de nitions for H and L.
Speci c Voting Patterns
With the general framework established thus far, the replicated system design is veri ed on the premise that the Full Recovery Property holds. This property depends on the details of each v oting pattern and must be established separately for each. Following are three voting schemes and their proofs. The last one is the most general and constitutes the goal of this work; the other two can be seen as special cases whose proofs are simpler and instructive.
Continuous Voting
We begin with the simplest case, namely when the voting pattern calls for voting all the data on every frame. Clearly, this leads to transient fault recovery in a single frame. Although the entire state of a recovering processor is restored in one frame, our formalization of rec assumes one frame is used to recover the frame counter, so the conservative assignment N R = 2 is used. Proof. Since V P i; j; k holds for all i; j; k, and N R = 2, expanding the de nition of rec shows that reci; j; f; N R ; T reduces to T for all i; j; f.
Cyclic Voting
Next we consider a more sparse voting pattern, namely voting only the data computed in the current frame. Only the portion of r:resultsi; j where i = r:frame is voted; the other M , 1 portions are voted in later frames. This leads to voting each part of the results state exactly once per cycle and therefore leads to transient fault recovery in M +1 frames. One frame is required to recover the frame counter. The proof in this case is only slightly more di cult. Because the modulus of is M this expression evaluates to T.
Minimal Voting
The last case is concerned with the most general characterization of voting requirements. Minimal voting is the name used to describe these requirements because they represent conditions necessary to recover from transient faults via the most sparse voting possible. Central to the approach is the use of task I O graphs, constructed from the application task specications embodied in the function T I . Nodes in the graph denote cells in the task schedule and directed edges correspond to the ow of data from a producer task to a consumer task. Sensor inputs and actuator outputs have no edges in these graphs. Associated with edges of the graph are voting sites that indicate where task output data should be voted before being supplied as input to the receiving task.
The essence of the Minimal Voting scheme is that every cycle 2 of the task I O graph should be covered by at least one voting site. It is possible to place more than one vote along a cycle or place votes along noncyclic paths, but they are unnecessary to recover from transient faults. Such super uous votes may be desirable, however, to improve the transient fault recovery rate. The condition requires at least one vote along each cycle. There is a caveat, however, on where the votes may be placed. Because voting occurs at the end of a frame, a vote site may not be speci ed on an edge between two cells of the same frame. Such placements are ruled out by the condition above. The bound N R includes a worst case length to restore a state element, L C + L N , plus an additional M frames to account for maximum latency due to when the last fault occurred within the schedule. Note that all cycles must have frame lengths that are multiples of M. Thus, construction of the recovery tree for a term reci; j; f; h; e corresponds to building a complete recursive expansion of the boolean term. The marking at the root after the construction process is the value of the term. Proof. Along the path P, b e t w een every pair of computation nodes there will be fle,1 noncomputation nodes one frame apart, where e is the edge in the task graph corresponding to this pair. Summing them all makes F L GP P = F L P . Proof. To show reci; j; f; N R ; T , construct the recovery tree for this term. Consider each leaf node v i and its path P i to the root w. Let P i be the concatenation of three subpaths X;Y;Z, where Y is the maximal subpath beginning and ending with a computation node. Let u be the rst node of Y and let G denote the task graph. By Lemma 2 it follows that F L GPY = F L Y and because the maximum frame separation between computation nodes is M, By Lemma 1, it follows that the root is marked with T and therefore reci; j; f; N R ; T holds.
The results presented above are conservative, being based on a loose upper bound for N R . The actual N R for most graphs will be somewhat smaller. The worst case for the graph of gure 5 is actually 10 frames versus the estimated value of N R = 12. In addition, for more dense and highly regular voting patterns such a s C o n tinuous Voting and Cyclic Voting, we can obtain more accurate values and it would be inadvisable to apply the Minimal Voting bound to these cases.
An important consequence of the Minimal Voting result is that if a graph has no cycles, then no voting is required! In this case the recovery time bound would be given exactly by N R = L N + M. Although such a task graph is untypical for real control systems, there may be applications that could be based on this kind of design.
Summary
We h a v e presented a method for specifying and verifying architectures for fault-tolerant, real-time control systems. The paper develops a uniprocessor toplevel speci cation that models the system as a single ultra-reliable processor and a second-level specication that models the system in terms of redundant computational units. The paper then develops an approach to proving that the second-level speci cation is an implementation of the top-level. We h a v e explored di erent strategies for voting and presented a correctness proof for three voting strategies. The Minimal Voting results o er real promise for building fault-tolerant systems with low v oting overhead.
